cscli scenarios install sigmahq/proc_creation_win_office_exec_from_trusted_locations1type: trigger2name: sigmahq/proc_creation_win_office_exec_from_trusted_locations3description: |4 Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code.5filter: |6 (evt.Meta.service == 'sysmon' && evt.Parsed.EventID == '1') && ((evt.Parsed.ParentImage endsWith '\\explorer.exe' || evt.Parsed.ParentImage endsWith '\\dopus.exe') && (evt.Parsed.Image endsWith '\\EXCEL.EXE' || evt.Parsed.Image endsWith '\\POWERPNT.EXE' || evt.Parsed.Image endsWith '\\WINWORD.exe' || evt.Parsed.OriginalFileName in ['Excel.exe', 'POWERPNT.EXE', 'WinWord.exe']) && (evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Word\\Startup\\' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Templates\\' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '\\Microsoft Office\\Templates\\') && not (evt.Parsed.CommandLine endsWith '.dotx' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine endsWith '.xltx' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine endsWith '.potx'))7blackhole: 2m8#status: test9labels:10 service: windows11 confidence: 112 spoofable: 013 classification:14 - attack.t12021516 label: "Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location"17 behavior : "windows:audit"18 remediation: false1920scope:21 type: ParentProcessId22 expression: evt.Parsed.ParentProcessId2324