cscli scenarios install sigmahq/proc_creation_win_vscode_tunnel_renamed_execution1type: trigger2name: sigmahq/proc_creation_win_vscode_tunnel_renamed_execution3description: |4 Detects renamed Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel5filter: |6 (evt.Meta.service == 'sysmon' && evt.Parsed.EventID == '1') && ((evt.Parsed.OriginalFileName == '' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine endsWith '.exe tunnel' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '.exe tunnel' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '--name ' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '--accept-server-license-terms' || evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains 'tunnel ' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains 'service' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains 'internal-run' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains 'tunnel-service.log') && not (evt.Parsed.Image endsWith '\\code-tunnel.exe' || evt.Parsed.Image endsWith '\\code.exe') || evt.Parsed.ParentCommandLine endsWith ' tunnel' && evt.Parsed.Image endsWith '\\cmd.exe' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '/d /c ' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains '\\servers\\Stable-' && evt.Parsed.CommandLine contains 'code-server.cmd' && not (evt.Parsed.ParentImage endsWith '\\code-tunnel.exe' || evt.Parsed.ParentImage endsWith '\\code.exe'))7blackhole: 2m8#status: test9labels:10 service: windows11 confidence: 112 spoofable: 013 classification:14 - attack.t1071.0011516 label: "Renamed Visual Studio Code Tunnel Execution"17 behavior : "windows:audit"18 remediation: false1920scope:21 type: ParentProcessId22 expression: evt.Parsed.ParentProcessId2324