sudo cscli collections install ZoeyVid/npmplusInstalls 5 parsers and 54 scenarios, via WAF - Virtual Patching.
View NPMplus →sudo cscli appsec-rules install crowdsecurity/vpatch-CVE-2026-114938Then reload CrowdSec: sudo systemctl reload crowdsec
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name: crowdsecurity/vpatch-CVE-2026-114938description: 'Detects Java4Shell (OpenJDK AVX-512 Base64 decoder heap overflow): a base64/base64url token of 32+ chars ending in = whose length is not a multiple of 4, in auth/cookie headers and in parameters targeted by public PoCs'rules:# Trigger: a base64 token ending in '=' whose length is not a multiple of 4 (the decoder# underflows on the 1-3 char tail). Valid padded base64 is always a multiple of 4.## Values that join several fields with '-' or '.' around valid base64 (e.g. Cloudflare's# __cf_bm cookie) must not read as one long token, so:# - the token body uses one alphabet, standard (+/) or URL-safe (-_), as Java's decoders# reject a mix before the vulnerable tail; the 0-2 tail chars accept both;# - whole-value zones (cookies, args) are anchored, and a JWT is exactly 3 segments.# In those zones a URL-safe token is only checked inside a JWT, recognised by an 'eyJ'# segment (base64url of '{"'): a prefix such as '1.0.1_' or 'shcac_' in front of padded# base64 forms a valid-looking URL-safe token, which blocked real traffic. A standalone# URL-safe token containing '-' or '_' in a cookie or argument is no longer detected.## Building blocks, repeated in the regexes below (written out because YAML has no variables):# TAIL = (?:==?|[a-z0-9+/_-](?:==?|[a-z0-9+/_-]=)) '=', '==', 'X=', 'X==' or 'XX='# STD = (?:[a-z0-9+/]{4}){8,} TAIL 32+ chars, standard alphabet# URL = (?:[a-z0-9_-]{4}){8,} TAIL 32+ chars, URL-safe alphabet# O = [a-z0-9_=-]* another JWT segment# SHAPE = STD | URL.eyjO.O | eyjO.(?:URL.O | O.URL) (STD, or URL in any segment of a JWT)# TAIL and SHAPE share their common prefixes: Go's regexp runs alternatives in parallel, so# this halves the work on long cookie values (8 KB worst case: ~1.4 ms -> ~0.7 ms).- or:# Credentials follow a scheme ("Basic x", "Bearer h.p.s") or sit in parameters# ("data=x,"), so the token is found between boundaries instead of anchored. The left# boundary keeps a match from starting inside a longer, valid token.# Header size is capped by servers, which keeps the full scan cheap.- zones:- HEADERSvariables:- Authorization- Proxy-Authorizationtransform:- lowercasematch:type: regexvalue: '(?:^|[\s.=;,])(?:(?:[a-z0-9+/]{4}){8,}|(?:[a-z0-9_-]{4}){8,})(?:==?|[a-z0-9+/_-](?:==?|[a-z0-9+/_-]=))(?:[.;,]|\s*$)'# ^"?SHAPE"?$ : the whole cookie value is one standard token, or a 3-segment JWT with
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This rule provides virtual patching for CVE-2026-114938 (Java4Shell), a heap out-of-bounds write in the AVX-512 Base64 decoder of OpenJDK 17, 21, 25 and 27. The rule crowdsecurity/vpatch-CVE-2026-114938 blocks the malformed Base64 that triggers the bug in auth headers, cookies and the parameters public exploits use, before the request reaches the JVM. It is a stopgap while you update Java, not a fix.
Updated 2026-11-18 10:16 UTC. As of this date, no exploitation in the wild has been reported and the CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog.
You are exposed if a Java service decodes untrusted Base64 with java.util.Base64 and runs an affected JDK on an x86-64 CPU with AVX-512 VBMI (Intel Ice Lake and later, AMD Zen 4 and later). Pre-authentication RCE has been demonstrated against Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate. ARM64 servers, Java 11 and Java 17.0.0 to 17.0.5 are not affected.
CVSS: 8.1 (High), CVSS 3.1, from OpenJDK and Oracle; 9.2 (Critical), CVSS 4.0, from the Calif.io researchers who found the bug.
The rule blocks a Base64 or Base64url token of 32 or more characters that ends in = or == and whose length is not a multiple of 4. That is the shape of the Java4Shell trigger: the decoder computes a negative output size for the short padded tail and writes past the end of its buffer before Java rejects the input. The characters themselves do not matter, so the rule matches the shape, not the repeated A of the public proofs of concept. Valid padded Base64 always has a length divisible by 4 and does not match. The token must use a single alphabet, standard (+/) or URL-safe (-_), since Java's decoders reject a mix before reaching the vulnerable code. This keeps values that join several fields with -, such as Cloudflare's __cf_bm cookie, from being read as one long token.
The rule inspects:
Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers, with each JWT segment checked on its own;state, code and SAMLRequest (Keycloak), jql (Jira), and data, base64, token, payload and q (generic Java applications), sprayed by the public CrashLeak proof of concept;data, base64 and payload.The rule does not inspect other parameters, custom headers, XML or SOAP bodies etc.
1cscli appsec-rules install crowdsecurity/vpatch-CVE-2026-114938
The rule is part of the crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching collection. It only sees traffic that goes through a CrowdSec bouncer with AppSec enabled, in front of the Java service.
Virtual patching mitigates exploitation attempts, but it does not fix the underlying vulnerability: upgrading the JDK to 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 or 27.0.1.1 (or your vendor's equivalent: Temurin, Corretto, Zulu, Microsoft, Liberica) is always recommended. Until then, starting the JVM with -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics disables the vulnerable code path; containers must be recreated for the flag to apply.
See also our blog article